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We live in a bio-political age. The gravitational centre of political existence has today 
shifted from juridical constructions of sovereignty, toward modes of governance that are 
more dispersed and predicated on maximising the productive capacities of corporeal 
subjects. One of the obligations of life in this age is to think about human existence as 
the existence of the human as animal, and so much so that the relationship between 
human and non-human animals must become the defining existential problematization. 
As Foucault once noted “for millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a 
living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an 
animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question” (History of 
Sexuality 143). In other words, questions about the relationship between humans and 
aspects of their existence that are shared with other animals are long-standing, but they 
have also acquired greater resonance at different points in time, sometimes defining a 
historical period. As a result of the historical importance that corporeal existence has 
assumed today, the relationship between human and non-human animals – the hitherto 
under-examined site wherein to inquire about the ways in which bio-political 
governmentality “places [human] existence as a living being into question” – exercises 
considerable attention within and without academic contexts. Simply put, the 
relationship between human and non-human animals has become an obligatory matter 
of concern (Calarco).i 
In this paper, we contribute to the further articulation of this matter of concern 
by examining a recent commemoration of transhumance, a pastoral practice involving 
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the structured, seasonal movement of herds and herders, aiming thereby to engage with 
Buller’s provocative proposition that movement is key to reaching a better 
understanding of the relationship between human and non-human animals (see also 
Hodgetts and Lorimer).ii Whilst Buller does not clarify what movement is to him and 
seems to understand movement primarily as an observable phenomenon, we articulate 
different conceptions of movement, exploring their implications for the understanding 
of the relationship between human and non-human animals. Specifically, we examine 
movement at work in two fields of investigation, empirical and theoretical. In the 
empirical field, movement is the observed feature of relations between human and non-
human animals. In the theoretical field, movement is instead conceptualised as 
involving relations between self and other and as entailing either a dynamic of 
becoming otherwise, a process of finding oneself, or an oscillation between singularity 
and multiplicity. Thus, in a manner very similar to Wadiwel’s discussion of non-human 
animals’ capacity for resistance, we examine conceptual categories in action, but our 
approach is not as much deconstructive, as an exercise in heterology (Buchanan).iii 
We approach the task of capturing the relationship between contemporary bio-
political existence, the lives of non-human animals and movement by turning to 
TransHumance. This performative commemoration of transhumance offers great scope 
to examine the proposed multiple conceptions of movement and their bearing on the 
relationship between human and non-human animals. We begin by introducing how this 
performance spurs us to imagine diverse modes of co-existence, and we focus 
particularly on how the equine, blinking gaze, which the authors of TransHumance have 
adopted as their signature and appears intermittently throughout the performance, 
prompts us to pay particular attention to movement itself. Then, in the third section of 
this paper, we examine how transhumance, as the historical pastoral practice which 
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TransHumance seeks to document, offers two perspectives on movement and its 
implications for the relationship between human and non-human animals. We show 
how these two perspectives bring to light the violence of the relationship between 
human and non-human animals but offer little scope for any overturning of the latter’s 
subjection to such violence. In the fourth section, we examine TransHumance as a work 
of art, aiming to explore other conceptions of movement which the horse’s blink 
triggers. We suggest that the blink operates in a way which denaturalises movement and 
opens up the possibility of thinking about movement differently. We begin to do so by 
turning to Marchesini’s (Etologia) and Cimatti’s (Filosofia dell’Animalità) 
philosophical reflections on human existence and its relationship to the lives on non-
human animals, aiming to offer an interpretation of the blink as registering the presence 
of another subject and as provoking the movement of becoming otherwise.iv The two 
philosophers’ debate is important today because it focusses on the possibility of 
attributing subjectivity to non-human animals. This issue is considered key to advancing 
our understanding of “real” animals (Haraway, Species) and, importantly, to fostering a 
different politics of living together, a politics which is attentive to the needs and desires 
of non-human animals with which we share our existence.v Our examination of 
movement shows that the attribution of subjectivity to non-human animals reproduces 
the violence of their contemporary subordination. It points out that the articulation of 
the conditions for co-existence requires a reconceptualization of existence beyond the 
divisions between human and non-human animals that the “anthropological machine” 
operates (Agamben, The Open).vi Therefore, in the fifth and final substantive section, 
the paper turns to Nancy’s work which, despite its radical non-anthropocentrism 
(Bingham 492), has been rarely mobilised to consider the relationship between human 
and non-human animals.vii This discussion is again sparked by the blink, which we now 
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equate with the act of touching, a sensual act that is pivotal to Nancy’s articulation of a 
non-anthropocentric conception of existence. Drawing on this work, we propose a 
conception of movement as oscillation and examine what it may entail for rethinking 
the relationship between human and non-human animals. Our ultimate aim is to advance 
an understanding of this relationship that is not prey to the humanism underpinning the 
attribution of subjectivity to non-human animals.  
Why TransHumance? 
TransHumance is a multi-sited and multi-media performance, which the company 
Théâtre du Centaure first presented in Marseille, in 2013. 
The manifesto for the performance (Théâtre du Centaure, Manifeste) is 
particularly interesting. It combines words and images to convey the post-humanist 
ambition to transcend all division between human and non-human animals, the 
individual and the collective. Thus, one of its poetic declarations reads as follows: 
I want close my eyes and dream of something extraordinary: 
Animals and humans walking together. 
It could be you, it could be me, but not quite. It would be us. 
I want to dissolve myself, I want to be a flock on the move, a swarm of bees, a 
flight of swallows ... (our trans.) 
It is a self-consciously revolutionary manifesto (see also Théâtre du Centaure, Dossier 
Pédagogique). In keeping with this transformative mood, the style is modernist and 
minimalist. At the same time, the play with words that lends the performance its title 
also evokes the traditions of transhumance. This is a practice that is today enjoying 
renewed interest, at both the cultural and institutional levels, and we would wish to add 
that such attention should be understood as stemming from movement itself, as much as 
from the assembly of human and non-human animals.viii  
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At the same time, the cinematic rendition of this manifesto (Théâtre du 
Centaure, TransHumance) moves the critical register away from modernist, 
revolutionary abstraction to the contingencies of time and place, and, in so doing, 
exposes a number of fissures within the fabric of its critique of the division between 
human and non-human animals. This cinematic rendition begins with a visual evocation 
of past configurations of the relationship between human and non-human animals. 
These include references to pre-modern trading relations between Marseille, Florence 
and Rome, which were built primarily around sheep and their wool, as well as 
reminders of later, colonial associations with the Maghreb, which the cinematography 
extends into the present, by transforming Berber horsemen into the ululating denizens of 
Marseille’s dilapidated Quartiers Nord. These narratives are drawn to a close by 
bringing non-human animals back into the contemporary urban space, challenging its 
partitioning of the lives of human and non-human animals by juxtaposing the majestic 
horses and flocks of urban pigeons, proverbially no better than rats with wings. The 
pigeons scatter as a feminine centaur rides into the city, standing on three horses 
running together and in unison. The abolition of difference and the freedom that this 
movement is supposed to actuate are delivered by the final frames, which intercut 
images of horses running freely through the streets with images of schoolkids laughing 
and running through the very same streets. All are free. Yet, just as the worried 
expression of a motorist leading the entry of the centaur into the city betrays the staging 
of all this movement, so does the occasional glimpse of the tethers corralling the horses 
on which the centaur rides. Movement thus enables the abolition of difference and the 
realisation of freedom, but the coordination of the multiple and diverse bodies so 
released also seems to rest on the operation of power. As a result, the cinematic 
rendition could be regarded as pointing unwittingly to the dynamics of revolutionary 
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process, allowing the viewer to observe the ever-present working of power and the 
impossibility of getting rid of the anthropological machine differentiating and ordering 
relations between human and non-human animals. History, in other words, matters. ix 
The complexity of the transhumant apparatus, if not the assemblage, which 
TransHumance seeks to commemorate, is captured in a photograph of one of the living 











As the centaur, with the aid of watchful sheepdogs, corrals sheep into an “animaglyph” 
on the stony and barren Crau, the sculpture offers a visual representation of power and 
its ordering of the apparatus’ component parts (Figure 1). In so doing, it opens up all the 
problems involved in imagining how humans and non-humans might live together, how 
the human animal might melt into “a flock on the move, a swarm of bees, a flight of 
swallows” (Manifeste). At the same time, there seems to be something more at work in 
TransHumance, which is related to movement, but also beyond movement. This excess 
is conveyed by a horse’s blinking eye, which features on both the cover of the textual 
rendition of the manifesto and Théâtre du Centaure’s home-page (Figure 2). 
Figure 1. Animaglyph; reproduced with 
the permission of Théâtre du Centaure, 
2017. 
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The horse’s blink serves as a very useful reminder that movement and stasis enjoy a 
complicated relationship, which Muybridge and Marey famously explored in their 
photographs of human and non-human animals in movement, photographs in which the 
horse featured prominently (MacMahon and Lawrence). We propose to extend to the 
examination of movement, animal bodies and the moment of vision which they thus 
initiated by equating the blink and the operation of the cinematographic shutter. The 
shutter produces the illusion of movement by alternating between the passage of light 
and its interruption. As such, movement, which cinema purports to capture, is in fact an 
effect of the arrangement of a photographic series. 
 
 
In similarly problematising movement, the blink opens up the possibility of thinking the 
relationship between self and other differently. In other words, we propose to 
understand the blink as opening a gap between the human self and animal other, which 
precipitates questions about movement, the lives of non-human animals and 
contemporary bio-political existence. 
Figure 2. Still from Théâtre du Centaure’s website; 




As observed above, TransHumance provokes questions about the relationship between 
self and other, but this provocation also stems from the documentation of transhumance, 
from the performance’s drawing attention to diverse bodies and the conceptual 
implications of their relative movements. We begin the exploration of this complex by 
examining how transhumance, as documented in TransHumance, can be approached 
from two different vantage points, one focusing on the conjunction of bodies and 
movement, and the other on the agency of movement itself. 
Transhumance as economic activity 
In the cinematic version of TransHumance, the imagery associating Marseille and 
diverse sites across the western Mediterranean is a reminder that the seasonal movement 
of sheep, cows and horses was once a highly lucrative activity. On this understanding, 
how humans extract value from other animals is problematic. 
The most familiar mode of extracting value from non-human animals is to 
enclose them and intensify the enclosure’s productivity. It is also possible, however, to 
extract value by organising movement so as to optimise the exploitation of land held in 
common. Perhaps most famously, the Kingdom of Castile, principal actor in the 
commercial networks in which Marseille once participated, sought to improve the 
quantity and quality of wool produced within its confines by regulating the movement 
of herds between common land designated as either winter or summer pasture (Phillips 
and Phillips). If this mode of extracting value from animal bodies and the commons is 
largely forgotten, it is because, in the United Kingdom, home to the agricultural 
revolution, attention shifted increasingly from the management of movement between 
pastures to the livestock itself, in its corporeal existence (Franklin).x If transhumance 
seems today to be disappearing from large swathes of the world, it is not only because 
 9 
the common-land, on which the possibility of movement rests, is also disappearing, but 
also because this practice entails difficult negotiations between animals of different 
species to produce economically remunerative movement.xi 
Admittedly, this perspective on the creation of value contributes to the literature 
on animal productivity, which has focused primarily on fixed sites to examine how 
bodies are regimented so as to maximise the value of their component parts (Twine), 
thus overlooking productivity outside such sites. While Despret and Meuret’s have little 
to say about transhumance’s economic function, their examination of learning to be a 
transhumant shepherd is instructive in this regard (Composer avec le Moutons). It 
conveys how the relationship between human and non-human animals moving across 
common-land is as much a matter of disciplinary power as any enclosing arrangement, 
here intent on producing docile human and non-human animal bodies, well-drilled in 
seasonal movement (Foucault, Discipline and Punish). Consequently, one might want to 
treat circumspectly any understanding of transhumance and other, related modes of 
animal husbandry as providing a context in which to explore more “peaceful and 
intelligent mode[s] of relation with animals” (Porcher, Animal Work 304).xii The more 
important point is, however, that this account of transhumance points to the possibility 
that, for all the prominence of movement, this pastoral practice does not in fact provide 
any greater purchase on the relationship between human and non-human animals. If 
movement is as important as we have proposed, we may then need think about the 
phenomenon differently. 
What moves? 
The cinematic rendition of TransHumance is not just replete with images of human and 
non-human animal bodies in movement, but it also juxtaposes movement between 
places that are both spatially and temporally distant. To gain some greater purchase on 
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such movement and its importance to the relationship between human and non-human 
animals, we may need to ask, as Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos does, what exactly is 
moving. 
Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos challenges the 
received, anthropocentric understanding of transhumance by considering transhumant 
shepherds and their flocks as part of an assemblage that comes to life as they participate 
in the movement of the Earth. When we take up such radical decentring of both human 
and non-human animals, and start to ask what exactly is moving, we begin to see things 
that passed unnoticed in the previous account of transhumance. As the herd and 
shepherd move in accordance with the rhythm of the seasonal cycle and regeneration of 
pastures, the movement of this assemblage draws attention to the many structures that 
seek to channel such movement and generate profit. These structures range from the 
geo-political delimitations of the nation state and the regulatory apparatus governing 
infrastructure such as the roads along which the transhumant flock travels, to the 
maintenance of clear-cut divisions between the human and non-human animal.xiii In 
other words, once we centre the analysis upon the agency of movement itself, we start 
to see more fully the effects of the many, formerly invisible actors enabling 
transhumance. 
At the same time, however, the language of “assemblages”, which enables the 
focus on movement itself, would seem to diminish the hold of difference and its 
political purchase (see Legg). The account of difference on which this language is 
predicated is blind to the non-human animal, as Haraway rightly says about Deleuze, 
but we would add that this language enjoys the advantage of being equally blind to the 
human animal and its privileges. In other words, this symmetry calls into question the 
relationship of care sustaining political objections to the subordination of the non-
 11 
human animal. The ambivalence, if not scepticism, about Deleuzian accounts of the 
relationship between human and non-human animals is then unsurprising.xiv 
In sum, the first perspective on transhumance shows how its distinctive 
conjunction of movement and relations between the human and non-human animals is 
driven by the logic of economic exploitation, but it does not foster any transformation of 
our understanding of these relations. The second perspective focuses on movement 
itself, exposing the multitude of otherwise invisible agents sustaining transhumance, but 
it also deflects attention from the historically sedimented, differential relations 
motivating the critique of contemporary configurations of the relationship between 
human and non-human animals. Consequently, to see how attention to movement might 
transform our understanding of the relationship, we need to think about the phenomenon 
in less empirical terms. TransHumance, as a work of art, helps us to shift the discussion 
in just this direction. 
Theoretical configurations 
The intermittent presence of the horse’s blinking eye throughout Théâtre du Centaure’s 
performance is a visual reminder that TransHumance mobilises transhumance to foster 
the imagination of alternative configurations of the relationship between human and 
non-human animals. In this section, we analyse TransHumance’s attention to movement 
and the transgression of boundaries between human and non-human animals by taking 
note of the way in which the action of blinking can be associated with subjectivity and 
then turning to the debate between Marchesini and Cimatti over Marchesini’s attribution 
of subjectivity to non-human animals. While Marchesini’s argument has gained 
increasing international attention and approval, such approval does not always attend to 
its conceptual implications, which Cimatti discusses at length in his postscript to one of 
Marchesini’s more extended expositions of the argument for the attribution of 
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subjectivity to non-human animals. After detailing the terms of the debate between 
Cimatti and Marchesini and the conceptual impasse to which it draws attention, namely 
that the attribution of subjectivity to non-human animals threatens to undo the very 
notion of subjectivity, we turn to another possible understanding of the blink. Drawing 
on Nancy’s reflections on touch (Noli me Tangere) we discuss how this understanding 
fosters an alternative conception of movement that it is potentially more useful to the 
overcoming of the impasse confronting Cimatti and Marchesini. 
Discovering the other subject ... 
According to Alt’s account of Heidegger’s reflections on the relationship between 
blinking and Being (Dasein), the blink interrupts the unfolding of Being, exposing the 
limitations of present forms of being and opening onto possibilities of being otherwise. 
Importantly, Alt notes how the blink is precipitated in proximity with other beings 
(Mitsein). While Heidegger would disavow any extension of his thinking about the 
blink to the encounter with non-human animals, circumscribing their blinks as a 
physiological, rather than an expressive response, TransHumance seems to invite a 
different understanding. If one were to follow Marchesini’s thought, which we discuss 
below, this blink should be understood as registering the presence of another subject, 
and the task should be to bridge the differences that stand in the way of such 
recognition. On this understanding, it becomes possible to envision another conception 
of movement, as the movement of becoming otherwise.  
Marchesini’s central thesis is that the distinction between human and non-human 
animals is a fiction, which he sets out to contest by combining ethological observation 
and philosophical reflection (Etologia). Thus, Marchesini, the ethologist, observes how 
the behaviour of non-human animals is not easily reduced to either instinctive or 
conditioned responses, and that it is better understood instead as the exercise of choice 
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and creativity. The equation of such exercise and the presence of a subject leads him to 
question why subjectivity should be limited to the human animal alone. Marchesini, the 
philosopher, begins the enterprise of extending the entitlement to subjectivity to non-
human animals by exposing the pivotal, humanist distinction between res extensa and 
res cogitans to a systematic critique. He explains that the distinction has come to be 
employed evermore insistently in the aftermath of the Darwinian erasure of any 
qualitative difference between human and non-human animals. The claim is that 
although human and non-human animals may share many capacities (dotazioni), the life 
of non-human animals coincides totally with these capacities, whereas that of the human 
animal does not. The human animal employs these capacities in an instrumental fashion, 
so exemplifying the distinctive action of res cogitans. Marchesini admits that 
consciousness is invoked to sustain this distinction, but he also claims that these 
distinctively human capacities could be regarded equally well as tools in themselves. As 
a result, the differentiation is superfluous. The differentiation is also groundless because 
the majority of human actions are not conscious, but unconscious. Having thus cleared 
the ground, Marchesini then moves to reconsider behaviour without any regard to the 
differentiation between human and non-human species. The observed similarities 
between the uses to which human and non-human animals put their capacities are to be 
understood as product of common descent, tempered by the contingencies of 
developmental and experiential circumstance. Marchesini is no socio-biologist, 
however, inasmuch as he turns first to Spinoza’s understanding of affect and movement 
to deflate the distinction between communication and language, and also to disconnect 
desire from any sense of its being a drive impelled by something lacking. He then 
evokes Heidegger’s understanding of meaningful existence as the creation of worlds, to 
characterise existence as the continuous establishment of relations with novel agents, 
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and as an active, creative presence, rather than any passive exercise of a fixed set of 
capacities. On this understanding, if subjectivity consists in the exercises of sovereignty 
over one’s capacities and creative engagement with the alterity of the world, human and 
non-human animals share such subjectivity in equal measure. In other words, 
Marchesini would appear to combine Heidegger and Spinoza to argue that human and 
non-human animals are monads, devoid of interiority and intent upon an endlessly 
creative process of overcoming the present and becoming otherwise.xv 
If Marchesini then grants non-human animals that which was previously denied 
them and constituted their difference, Cimatti observes that this extension of 
subjectivity would seem to come at the cost of evacuating the very notion of 
subjectivity of all meaning. In fact, in a postscript to Marchesini’s exposition of his 
argument, Cimatti (Postfazione) proposes that Marchesini’s conception of subjectivity 
should be understood as advancing a form of panpsychism such that even Heidegger’s 
famed stone might be regarded as a subject. 
In an earlier work, which he summarises in the postscript, Cimatti draws out the 
implications of this difficulty, implications which call for some reconsideration of the 
extent to which Marchesini’s becoming otherwise involves any process of 
transformation at all. 
… Finding ourselves 
Contrary to Marchesini, Cimatti argues that subjectivity should be understood as 
consciousness of one’s existence and as an alienated being. In other words, according to 
Cimatti, to be a subject is to be conscious of one’s being irremediably split off from 
both oneself and the world. From this perspective, all reflection on the relationship 
between the human and the non-human animal is about the human and what it might 
mean to be human. Thus, if we were to follow Cimatti, movement toward the other 
 15 
subject, as provoked by the blinking expression which so captivates Théâtre du 
Centaure, is not so much a process of becoming otherwise, as it is a matter of 
discovering the complexity of our all too human subjectivity. 
As noted above, Marchesini regards the differentiation between human and non-
human animals as a historical artefact and emphasises the possibility of its overcoming, 
by recognising how unwarranted is the differentiation. Cimatti, mobilising an altogether 
different understanding of historicity, namely the historicity of Being, proceeds to 
question the possibility of transformation of existence that Marchesini seeks to advance. 
He argues more specifically that the subject’s adoption of its differentiating and 
individuating proper name cannot but separate it from the world on which it is, at the 
same time, dependent for every aspect of its existence. On Cimatti’s understanding, the 
animal is the imagined figure of the other in whom the human subject invests all hope 
of securing full possession of itself, however elusive this must be. From this 
perspective, the longing for the communion of all animals, human and non-human, 
which Marchesini could be said to articulate, should be understood as the expression of 
this subject’s alienation from itself and from the world in which it is immersed 
inescapably. Yet, as Cimatti also observes, as long as one holds on to any notion of 
subjectivity, such embrace of all things is bound to be self-defeating. Such embrace is 
only possible by exiting the symbolic order in which one participates from the moment 
of assuming one’s proper name. In other words, one can only become immanent by 
ceasing to be. At the same time, however, the desire for such annihilation emerges from 
the very symbolic order one wishes to exit. Anxiety about one’s nature and fate, as well 
hatred of the animal, are rooted in this fraught relationship to the world.xvi The 
alternative to this situation, Cimatti proposes, is to embrace the understanding of 
subjectivity as precarious and forever alienated, and to begin instead to explore the 
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limits of the symbolic order, seeking the chinks through which the world reveals itself, 
perhaps in the work of poetry, the very work on which Cimatti ends his postscript to 
Marchesini. 
In sum, if we were to follow Cimatti’s thought, the movement of recognition 
inaugurated by the blink would not involve a process of becoming otherwise because on 
such an understanding that which is found on the other side would be the self-same 
subject. As such, the movement that the blink prompts would imply the work of 
traversal and reconciliation with one’s own alienation. While such quietism seems an 
inadequate response to the violence of the relationship between human and non-human 
animals, it is also possible to understand poetry as productive and transformative.xvii 
This productive understanding of poetry may explain how Marchesini and Cimatti are 
able to engage in a constructive discussion, despite the latter’s provocative proposition 
that “there are no animals … [and] ... the only animals we know are those we have 
invented for ourselves” (Filosofia dell’Animalità vii). This productive understanding of 
poetry also is the blink’s work. In other words, for us the blink is a poetic gesture that 
points to something beyond itself, and the remaining task is to understand to what it 
points to and how does it do so.  
Minding the gap 
The eventual turn of the dialogue between Marchesini and Cimatti’s to poetry enables 
us to see how TransHumance might be understood as articulating three different modes 
of co-existence between human and non-human animals. 
In the cinematic rendition of TransHumance, the final frames intercut images of 
horses running freely through the streets and images of laughing schoolkids running 
through the very same streets. In so doing, these images exemplify the first mode of co-
existence, in which human and non-human animals appear to be freed from the violence 
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of differentiation. If this also exemplifies Marchesini’s imagined, new relationship 
between human and non-human animals, the notion of freedom which the movement is 
meant to convey also rests on a fundamentally bio-political set of assumptions. As 
Cimatti might answer, such freedom is the actualisation of a presumed, common mode 
of existence, and, as such, it cannot but evacuate the notion of freedom of its 
transcendent meaning. The centaur exemplifies the second mode of co-existence. Like 
the transhumant shepherd, the centaur is imagined as leading the movement of the flock, 
but she is also visibly dependent on the different bodies assembled to deliver 
coordinated movement, without which the movement would be artless and graceless, as 
well as economically un-remunerative. Understanding the orderly relationship between 
the diverse parts of this assemblage is fraught with difficulty, however, insofar as 
treating them as equal contributors to the assemblage’s operations drifts toward a bio-
political reading, but any insistence on difference drifts back toward the sovereignty of 
anthropocentrism (see also Thompson). The dialogue between Marchesini and Cimatti 
is best understood as a struggle with these two constructions of co-existence, which are 
caught between the violence of differentiation and the equally violent effects of erasing 
difference. It seems to us that Nancy provides the resources to think constructively 
about this space in between, and also enables us to understand the blink not just as 
Théâtre du Centaure’s signature, but also as the signature of a third mode of being 
together (see Agamben, Signature). 
Nancy regards the sensual act of touch as opening a gap in the fabric of the 
world and argues that existence must be understood in relation to this opening, not as an 
interruption, but as a positive and constitutive event. We suggest that the blink opens up 
a similar gap. This, as we explain below, leads us to propose the movement of 
oscillation across the gap as a third mode of co-existence evoked in TransHumance. 
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Firstly, unlike Cimatti and Marchesini, who are attached to some understanding 
of subjectivity and its primacy, Nancy seeks to decentre and spatialise existence. Nancy 
(Being Singular Plural) does so by arguing that existence not only takes the form of 
irreducible plurality, such that the unfolding of Being (Dasein) must be understood as 
the unfolding of Being-with (Mitdasein), and in a manner that is not to be confused with 
being-with (Mitsein). Primacy rests with the relation that Being-with entails, rather than 
any shared substance, so moving away from the philosophy of substance in which 
Cimatti and Marchesini ground their understanding of the relationship between humans 
and non-human animals. The fuller implications of this understanding are visualised 
best by means of the Christological imagery that Nancy has sometimes employed to 
articulate his thinking (Noli me Tangere). Following this imagery, one is called to 
distinguish between the notion of touch at stake in Thomas’ relationship to Christ’s 
body, whereby the real is guaranteed by the possibility of touch, and the relationship 
between Christ and Mary Magdalen, whereby the real is produced by detachment and 
the denial of touch in the famed “noli me tangere” scene. The opening up of a gap in the 
fabric of the world, in other words, is both the condition of possibility and the denial of 
touch, as well as productive of all that flows from touch. Similarly, the blink opens up a 
gap between what comes to be the horse and the onlooker gazing at one another, setting 
in motion the series of questions about the relationship between human and non-human 
animals which TransHumance poses. On this understanding of the blink, the 
relationship between human and non-human animals is as problematic as Marchesini 
and Cimatti observe, but the problem they address only emerges the moment when we 
come to be named and differentiated from the others, imagining ourselves here, as 
gazing subjects, in a relationship to them over there, the objects of our gaze. The greater 
 19 
the distance imagined, the greater the violence of the relationship, but the violence is 
inescapable and the corresponding allure of immanence great. 
Secondly, Nancy’s reflections on the relationship between words and images 
(The Ground of the Image) offer a way of thinking about this understanding of Being-
with as a relationship between immanence and transcendence. Nancy considers the 
relationship between text and image, asking how they come alive, that is, how they 
amount to more than inscriptions, conveying something in excess of what they are in 
themselves. While asking how images can be said to speak and texts illustrate, Nancy 
refers to the action of oscillation which both separates text and image, but also sustains 
their mutually constitutive relationship. The blink, we suggest, operates in these same 
terms. It inaugurates movement across the gap, an oscillation between the recognition of 
another subject and the rejection of all differentiation. The movement cannot but be in 
the form of oscillation because neither mode of existence is tenable. As Nancy might 
say, existence is the experience of the fragmentation consequent upon our being both 
singular and multiple (see also James). As a result, where all the previous explorations 
of the declensions of movement and the relationship between human and non-human 
animals privileged either movement or the relationship over the other, something like 
Nancy’s oscillation offers an understanding of existence that retains the Deleuzian 
emphasis on movement and process, while also holding onto difference as the 
interruption of continuity (Dejanovic). Crucially, the relationality that is consequently 
involved in all forms of existence is a potent ethical bond because the vulnerability of 
any one body becomes a vulnerability which each and every other individuated body 
involved cannot but share. It is an exposure for which all are responsible because each 
and every body involved is not in a relation with the others, but is the relation. As 
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Watkin puts it, this body must be understood as an “irreducibly open ... singularity that 
cannot sequester itself from the web of singular plurality without which it is not” (61). 
In sum, the blink allows us to glimpse an alternative mode of Being, the spatial 
unfolding of an existence in the midst of a multitude of others, which is never reducible 
nor coincides with one body or another, be it human or non-human. Arguably, the 
carving out of this form of being is what is distinctive about some recent endeavours to 
regenerate highland communities by reconfiguring relations between their human and 
non-human inhabitants. These relations certainly remain instrumental, but they are also 
understood to require an opening up to difference and heteronomy to achieve their 
promise of regeneration (see Palladino, What’s in a Name?). 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have engaged with Buller’s intuition that movement might be crucial 
to reaching a new understanding of the relationship between humans and non-human 
animals by drawing on TransHumance, a recent commemoration of transhumance, to 
examine the implications of his provocation. In so doing, we have explored how 
attention to movement as an observable phenomenon may destabilise distinctions 
between human and non-human animals, so facilitating the overcoming of the 
anthropocentrism, and also how the shift away from historically sedimented categories 
seems to come at the cost of political and ethical engagement in the lives of non-human 
animals. Yet, greater attention to the theoretical specification of these categories seems 
equally often at risk of discovering that the analysis of the relationship between them is 
dealing not with difference, but with sameness, with human identity with itself. As a 
result, the attention to movement never overcomes the problematic nature of 
distinctions between human and non-human animals, but simply displaces the problem, 
onto the productivity of poetic representation. 
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What we think is at issue in this impasse is the fraught relationship between 
substance and process, which is sometimes betrayed by the ambivalence that critics as 
different as Haraway and Agamben share in regard to Deleuzian understanding of the 
non-human animal. In other words, when Agamben proposes that Deleuzian thought is 
uniquely capable of thinking about animal existence “in an absolutely non-
anthropomorphic way” (The Open 39-40), or Haraway suggests more caustically that 
there is little to learn about “actual wolves” (Species 29) from Deleuze and Guattari’s 
discussion of wolves and becoming-animal, what is at issue is a fundamental division 
within metaphysics. This is the division between attention to that which is given, the 
substance of the world, and attention to the processes out of which substance emerges, 
or the coming into being of that which will have been given. This division is why we 
discuss how Nancy’s understanding of Being-with offers a promising approach to the 
conjunction of movement and the relationship between human and non-human animals. 
Nancy’s understanding of Being-with, whereby the understanding of Being and 
becoming is detached from any singular form and the two are transformed into 
expressions of the multitude, sharpens our understanding of the relationship between 
human and non-human animals by focusing attention on the relationship itself, on the 
very hyphen keeping in tension the categories “human” and “animal”, and in a way that 
never settles on any one of the terms related, but keeps the relationship in movement. In 
sum, as Figure 1 reminds us, TransHumance and transhumance draw attention to 
different ways of thinking about the collective. TransHumance’s commemoration of 
transhumance contrasts, on the one hand, abstract syntheses of human and non-human 
animals on the move, and, on the other hand, historically sedimented relations between 
disparate forms-of-life, always already shaped by power. In so doing, it offers an 
alternative vision of contemporary bio-political existence, but it is only glimpsed in the 
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blink of the eye, just before existence is captured and fixed by the discursive apparatus 
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i See also Asdal et al.; Braverman. 
ii In a recent paper, Hodgetts and Lorimer draw together the fields of animal and mobility studies 
to explore how animals’ lives are configured and governed. They argue that attention to 
registers of mobility offers a richer understanding of contemporary relations between human 
and non-human animals. While Hodgetts and Lorimer’s approach to such relations is valuable, 
we are more interested in extending Buller’s understanding of animal existence as something 
so elusive as to be caught only fleetingly, like “a slash of light, then gone”. We argue that we 
must to go back to movement itself, as an ontological category, because such elusiveness has 
as much to do with the nature of thought about existence and the relationship between self and 
others, as it has to do with the evanescence of our encounters with the myriad of mostly 
invisible animals all around us. In so doing, we focus on just one among many registers of 
mobility, namely transhumance, but our narrower scope also enables us to consider what might 
be broadly described as the tension between attention to form, such as the registers toward 
which Hodgetts and Lorimer direct their readers, and attention to processes of formation such 
as those explored by critics more attuned to Deleuze and Deleuzian thought. This tension has 
been a source of seemingly intractable arguments about power and politics, including 
Haraway’s dismissal of Deleuzian perspectives on animal existence. We propose an 
alternative perspective, hoping that it might go some way toward the resolution of this tension. 
iii Wadiwel proposes that the concepts employed in posing questions about the capacities of 





resistance and the possibility that fish might be capable of such resistance, Wadiwel 
contrasts juridical denials and the implicit attributions of resistance that sustain activities 
such as sports fishing, concluding that the consequent indeterminacy should lead to a 
reconsideration of fishing practices. 
iv In recent years, Marchesini’s arguments for the attribution of subjectivity to non-human 
animals have enjoyed growing international attention (see Buchanan et al.; Amberson and 
Past). Such attention overlooks, however, the importance of the contemporaneous debate 
between Marchesini (Etologia) and Cimatti (Postfazione) over the conceptual problems 
involved in such attribution. 
v Current debates in human-animal studies emphasise the need to develop methodologies that 
are able to grasp, at least partially, real animals’ lives and experiences, as opposed to 
engaging with abstract, representational forms (see Hamilton and Taylor). This paper, 
however, does not propose an analysis of real animals by way of their representation in 
TransHumance, but seeks to examine instead what distinct conceptions of movement do 
when employed to understand relations between human and non-human animals. 
vi While our ambition is to contribute to current post-humanist critiques of the relationship 
between human and non-human animals, we are cognizant that the very language we use, 
beginning with the distinction between human and non-human animals, is prey to the 
operations of the anthropological machine we would wish to overturn, so that we can only 
hope to interfere with the machine’s effects. 
vii See also Goh; Veijola.  
viii Over the past few years, a number of documentaries about transhumance have received 
public attention, none more successfully than Sweetgrass (see also The Last Shepherd; 
Winter Nomads). Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ critical examination of transhumance, 
discussed in this paper, is based on another such documentary (Fame d’Erba). For a review 




Recently, such cultural resonance has resulted in a formal bid to UNESCO to grant 
transhumance the official status of “intangible cultural heritage of humanity” (Milanesi). 
Such institutional investment is the object of an ongoing study (see Colombino and Powers). 
ix Multi-species ethnography has proven an important site to the critique of categorical 
differentiation of the human from non-human animal (see Kirksey et al.; Hamilton and 
Taylor). Such critiques have tended to privilege the visibility of contemporary techno-
scientific sites, at the cost of more historically settled and embedded understanding of the 
relationship between human and non-human animals. The complexities of transhumance and 
its cultural representations suggest that the phenomenon may offer an especially valuable site 
for the further development of multi-species ethnography (see also Despret and Meuret, 
Composer avec les Moutons). 
x See also Woods. 
xi Arguably, the transformation of the livestock’s genetic constitution renders interspecific 
negotiation unnecessary. Where sheep are concerned, for example, upland ewes are now 
bred to maximise the number of lambs they are capable of bearing and mothering over the 
yearly reproductive cycle. The most productive of the ewes thus bred are then selected for 
mating with rams that are bred for the quality of their carcass and whose female progeny is 
thought to inherit the breeding and mothering characteristics of the maternal line. Finally, the 
ewes thus produced are crossed with a third, lowland breed such that the resulting, terminal 
lambs are capable of extracting the most from the richest lowland pasture. Within this 
complex system of production, there no longer is any need for seasonal movement, at least 
not on a scale comparable to that previously required. 
xii See also Porcher (Ethics); Despret and Meuret (Cosmological Sheep) 
xiii While the colourful carts captured in the cinematic rendition of TransHumance convey the 
communal life shepherds and animals share in their seasonal movement between pastures, 




and others observe, transhumance amounts to an economically unrewarding life and to the 
extent that one should consider whether the sheep have sometimes been valued more than 
the shepherds themselves. Fontana notes, for example, how the shame involved in 
recollecting the life lived is a major difficulty in its reconstruction. As one shepherd who he 
interviewed put it to him: “I’ve also had to sleep in the open with the flock, and I’m not 
ashamed, no; there are many people who find it shameful to say ‘I have looked after sheep’. 
I do not bend my head in shame” (Fontana 14; our trans.; see also Aime et al.). 
Consequently, one needs to consider the extent to which contemporary, proliferating 
accounts of transhumance may be prey to nostalgia. 
xiv See Oliver; Shukin; but also Beaulieu; Palladino (What’s in a Name?). 
xv Although Marchesini rarely cites either Bergson or Deleuze, the proximity between 
Marchesini and Deleuze, the chief contemporary exponent of Begsonian conceptions of 
becoming, would then seem great. Yet, while articulating the terms of such proximity, 
Vignola also draws attention to a naturalistic understanding of human and non-human 
animals that would seem to distance Marchesini from Deleuze. Marchesini’s understanding 
is perhaps closer to Haraway’s distinctive combination of post-humanism with realism about 
animal bodies, than it is to Deleuze’s uncompromisingly post-humanist understanding of 
organic bodies and their production (see Deleuze and Guattari). 
xvi As Cimatti also observes, the confrontation with the animal and anxiety about human 
mortality are linked inextricably. The animal’s careless gaze is a reminder of the same 
named subject’s inescapable, eventual dissolution, in death. Marchesini, on the other hand, 
rarely discusses death and mortality, and the observation that “life is always central, even 
when we think we are-towards-death, since death is not a cessation nor a denial of life, but 
an act of life” (Over the Human 59) conveys the latter’s vitalism. Such vitalism reaffirms the 





xvii Cimatti’s analysis might be regarded as a Lacanian response to Derrida’s reflections on the 
relationship between the human and non-human animal, which can be read as a critique of 
Lacan and Lacanian understanding of language (see also Oliver). The resulting notion that 
this alienated life is the only life we can live would appear to approximate Haraway’s notion 
of “staying with the trouble” (Staying with the Trouble). 
xviii The argument advanced here may contribute to the clarification of what Agamben has called 
the mysterium disiunctionis (The Open 13) at the origin of the anthropological machine. 
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